briefs
Marine Casualties and Navigation Technology
Legal Considerations For Mariners And Operators
By Alan Weigel, Blank Rome LLP
Increasingly sophisticated electronic equipment has unquestionably reduced accidents and has improved the safety of vessel navigation. Some recent events have demonstrated, however, that the new equipment still involves all too familiar problems. For example, on November 7, 2007, the M/V Cosco Busan struck the San Francisco Bay Bridge, rupturing a fuel oil tank and reportedly spilling 65,000 gallons of bunker fuel into the Bay. It was alleged that both of the vessel's radars showed "signs of trouble" and that the pilot was "unclear" of the meaning of certain symbols on the electronic charting system. For a vessel involved in a casualty where the use of electronic navigation equipment is an issue, several legal considerations come into play. Among the questions a court may have to consider are: Was the electronic navigation equipment installed and functioning properly and were the vessel's watchstanders properly using the equipment? Was navigation equipment installed and functioning properly? In 2005, the Singapore Maritime Authority warned vessels flying its flag that many AIS systems were transmitting incorrect or incomplete data. This warning has been confirmed by several recent studies that have discovered that as many as 80% of all AIS messages may contain some error or inaccuracy. As with any electronic equipment, many of these errors result from improper installation or un-noticed malfunction of properly installed equipment.
18 MN
When deciding issues related to the installation of electronic navigation equipment, courts are apt to draw analogies to cases involving the use of radar. For example, a tanker collided with an unlighted partially completed oil and gas tower in the Gulf of Mexico. The court presiding over the ensuing litigation found the vessel was unseaworthy because its improperly installed radar was a contributing factor in the collision. To help guard against this type of problem, many radar manufacturers provide calibration procedures as a standard part of their installation procedure. This does not yet appear to be the case for more recent types of navigation technology such as AIS and ECDIS. As a result, most vessel operators simply receive an installation report from the technician installing the new equipment. The International Association of Lighthouse Authorities has suggested that "A correctly installed AIS unit should not need any further calibration to continue operating." While the IALA's statement is technically correct, it begs the question of how a vessel owner or operator can prove as a legal matter that the equipment was installed correctly in the first place. Without a calibration report following the installation of an AIS or an ECDIS, can a vessel owner demonstrate that it exercised the due diligence required to make its vessel seaworthy? Once it has been established that an electronic navigation system has been properly installed and calibrated, the problem remains of maintaining it in
good operating condition. The failure to do so will frequently be deemed to be an improper navigation practice exposing the vessel involved in a casualty to a charge of unseaworthiness. In one case, a vessel was found unseaworthy where improper radar maintenance caused a radar failure that led to a grounding. The first step in maintaining navigation technology in good operating condition is to monitor its performance. Thus, prudent navigators have long recognized the need to check their ARPAs against known targets, both during pre-underway checks and when opportunities arise at sea. This practice has been codified in STCW Chapter A-VIII/2 Part 3-1, which requires a watch officer to monitor the performance of navigational equipment to be used during the watch by performing operational tests at sea and prior to port arrival or departure. The same procedure should be considered for AIS and for an ECDIS that integrates ARPA and AIS data. The IMO has provided recommended guidelines to watch officers for checking the accuracy of AIS data. The guidelines include periodically checking AIS static data and dynamic data during a voyage to validate the accuracy of the information being transmitted. Owners and operators should consider updating fleet instruction manuals to include the checking and monitoring of AIS and ECDIS equipment in accordance with the IMO guidelines.
February 2008